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Abstract:   Inter-firm information exchange with respect to the reliability of trade partners may be 
unmediated in the sense that it involves direct communication between the personnel of two firms.  
Alternatively, this information flow may be channeled by or through an organization such as a trade 
association.  We assess the relationship between these two mechanisms for conveying reputational 
information.  Based on evidence from five transition countries, we find that trade associations’ role 
as informational intermediaries in this regard is sensitive to the geographic relationship between a 
potential supplier (demander) of reputational information and the firm whose behavior may be 
reported (acquired).  What is more, the use of trade associations as conduits for reputation flows 
seems to be more strategic than the use of unmediated communication in that it is highly sensitive to 
the effects of market structure.    
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REPUTATION FLOWS:  CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES  




The way one behaves in a particular transaction, or series of transactions, will color his 
general business reputation … Sellers who do not satisfy their customers become the 
subject of discussion in the gossip exchanged by purchasing agents and salesmen, at 
meetings of purchasing agents' associations and trade associations, or even at country 




1.   Introduction 
As Macaulay suggested in his seminal article on relational contracting, business-to-business 
information flows with respect to the behavior of third parties can assume at least two general forms.  
They may be unmediated, in the sense of being direct communications between the personnel of two 
firms.  Alternatively, they may be assisted by a coordinating organization, such as a trade association, 
that has been designed (at least in part) for that purpose.  Both types of reputation flows, mediated and 
not, have been recognized for their ability to serve as the basis for relational contracting, to reduce 
search costs and to mitigate information asymmetries (Greif, 1993; Kali, 1999; Kandori, 1992; Klein, 
1992; Lizerri, 1999; Macaulay, 1963; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Milgrom et al., 1990; Rauch, 
2001).  But the economics literature is largely silent as to how the two interact.  Our knowledge is 
limited as to whether organizations that mediate reputation flows (1) add much, if any, value in the 
presence of pre-existing networks of unmediated communication or (2) if their marginal value, in this 
sense, is in any way contingent upon the economic environment.   This paper addresses both issues.    
Based on evidence from five transition countries, we find that some trade associations 
increase reputation flows even when controlling for pre-existing, unmediated communication.   Their 
value in this regard, however, is sensitive to several factors, including the geographic relationship 
between a potential supplier (demander) of reputational information and the firm whose history that  
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it may be interested in conveying (acquiring).  We also show that the use of trade associations as 
conduits for reputation flows is more strategic than the use of unmediated communication.  That is, 
the former is particularly sensitive to market structure effects and is not used when markets are 
particularly competitive.    
This study builds directly on the work of Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) in the 
sense of exploiting the same set of data and addressing the general theme of relational contracting.    
Among many noteworthy findings, Johnson et al. showed that membership in a trade association that 
provides information on prospective trade partners is associated with a firm both granting more 
trade credit to customers and being more willing to switch to new, price-competitive suppliers.2   As 
to this point, we might presume that access to an association’s information network reduces the risk 
associated with these actions by both facilitating relational contracting and mitigating information 
asymmetries.   However, accepting that it is trade associations themselves that facilitate the exchange 
of information requires controlling for a firm’s access to additional, perhaps unmediated, information 
networks and considering whether or not there might be an important selection bias for trade 
association membership.  On the first count, Johnson et al. decide not to give serious attention to the 
impact of variables measuring the frequency of a firm’s communication with other firms, both inside 
and outside its sector.3    The potential endogeneity between these variables and decisions either to 
grant trade credit or switch suppliers makes such a choice understandable (i.e., firms that either carry 
out or contemplate such actions are more likely to talk with other firms so as to become better 
informed about a current or prospective trade partner).  But one consequence of omitting these 
variables could be that the relationship between membership in a trade association and a firm’s 
willingness either to grant trade credit or to change suppliers is spurious.  That is, firms that already 
communicate with each other directly about trade partners and other matters may be more likely to 
join associations with those same firms with which they are in regular contact.   The relationship  
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found by Johnson et al. then could be due not to the impact of the trade association, per se, but to a 
pre-existing communication network.   That is, a veneer of mediation may simply conceal a set of 
well-established, unmediated ties.  In such a case, the marginal value of the association (in terms of 
increasing reputation flows) is negligible.   
In order to sort out the relative contributions of the different mechanisms for transmitting 
information and to avoid the noted endogeneity problem involved in assessing the relationship 
between a firm’s actions and its use of alternative information networks, we explore the determinants of 
reputation flows as opposed to their consequences.  Specifically, we investigate a firm’s responses to questions 
about a potential dispute involving a trade partner.  Why, in general terms, does such a dispute 
become known to a broader audience?  And what, in specific terms, is the role of alternative channels 
for these reputation flows?   In answering these questions, we are able to control for, and thus assess 
the inter-relationship between, mediated and unmediated channels. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant literature on mechanisms for 
transmitting reputation flows. Section 3 presents survey evidence on information exchange among 
manufacturing firms in five transition countries.  Section 4 investigates the factors that affect whether 
or not information on contractual disputes between firms is disseminated to other market 
participants.  Section 5 presents conclusions and implications. 
2.    Reputation Effects, Networks and Transition 
A given relationship between two firms may be situated within a wider network of relations.  
Parties that are “plugged in” can either access information from or provide information to the 
network as to the behavior of a current or potential trade partner.  A firm’s concern for its reputation 
within this larger community may thus curb the inclination to behave opportunistically within the 
context of a given bilateral relationship.   And in addition to providing a basis for relational  
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contracting, this information exchange within the network can increase the allocative efficiency of 
markets by reducing adverse selection.4     
In spite of their potential social value, the appearance of inter-firm reputation flows is not 
inevitable.  Presuming a positive cost of communication, the public-good-like qualities of 
information suggest that it will be underprovided by profit-motivated businesses.  What is more, 
even if the transmission costs are zero, a firm may not want to forego the rents that it could 
otherwise extract from trade partners by controlling a certain piece of information.  The economics 
literature, nevertheless, presents us with numerous examples of institutions that have emerged to 
disseminate reputations among self-interested actors (World Development Report, 1998/99 and 2002).  
Some of the most noteworthy studies have focused on institutions that evolved in the pre-modern 
era.  Greif (1993), for instance, shows how the rich, unmediated flow of information among 
dispersed Maghribi traders helped expand trade between Mediterranean Sea ports in the eleventh 
century. And Milgrom et al. (1990) demonstrate how the Champagne Fairs developed the institution 
of the Law Merchant to mediate reputation flows, allowing medieval traders to identify reliable 
partners from distant locales.  More recently, several authors have highlighted business associations 
as reputational intermediaries in developing countries (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Woodruff, 
1998).5 
It should not be surprising that the transition from centrally planned socialism provides an 
ideal setting in which to study the mechanisms for channeling reputation flows.  In the aftermath of 
communism's collapse, governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have struggled 
with establishing institutions to enforce private contracts, while at the same time firms have struggled 
with reducing the costs of transacting through the market.  In this environment, we would suspect 
that firms might have strong incentives to seek out and/or share information about their trade 
partners.  Based on a firm-level survey in Russia, Hendley et al. (2000) present evidence that  
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unmediated information sharing was important for ensuring contractual compliance and reducing 
information asymmetries.  However, they found that business associations played only a marginal 
role in helping to enforce contracts and spread information on prospective customers’ ability to pay.6    
This finding, however seems to conflict with those of Recanatini and Ryterman (2001) and Greif and 
Kandel (1995); both these studies present evidence suggesting that the constituents of business 
associations had superior access to information on the identity and trustworthiness of prospective 
trade partners.   That is, like Johnson et al. (2002), they suggest that business organizations do add 
value in the sense of improving inter-firm information flows.   
Although the aforementioned studies have contributed to our understanding of the 
consequences of reputation flows, they have generally been limited by a focus on single mechanisms 
for disseminating reputations.  Moreover, they have focused, perhaps understandably, on the 
behavioral effects of information exchange rather than on the exchange mechanisms themselves.    
Many markets, however, rely upon a diverse array of mediated and unmediated mechanisms rather 
than one to the exclusion of the other.  And since many economic actors face a choice as to how 
they either disseminate or access reputational information, understanding the reasons for and the 
effect of the mechanism(s) they choose to use requires understanding the full choice set.   Thus, in 
what follows, we explore the determinants of reputation flows giving particular attention to the inter-
relationship of alternate channels for inter-firm information exchange. 
3.   Data on Inter-Firm Communication 
The data presented here come from a 1997 survey sponsored by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.  Roughly 1500 small to medium-sized manufacturing firms from 
five transition countries participated.7  As shown in Table 1, the average firm in the survey has less 
than a hundred employees and was started after 1990.  More than those in Ukraine and Russia, the 
respondents in Eastern Europe operate in a more competitive environment, are more likely to both  
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be a de novo enterprise and express confidence in the ability of courts to enforce commercial 
contracts.  Table 1 also presents data on the percentage of firms in the respective countries that have 
experienced standard contractual problems with clients.  Over half of the firms had experienced a 
customer failing to pay for a delivery; roughly one quarter had had problems with a supplier that 
refused to either accept the return of defective merchandise to provide monetary compensation to 
the respondent.   
----------------------------- 
Place Tables 1 and 2 here 
----------------------------- 
The survey variables of greatest interest to us concern inter-firm communication.  Of course, 
there are many types of business-to-business information exchange besides that between two existing 
or potential trade partners.  Firms may communicate with competitors on matters of individual or 
mutual interest.  In addition to sharing information on potential trade partners, they might share 
ideas and experiences relating to production processes, collude to reduce the competitiveness of their 
market, or coordinate efforts to influence public policies.   Tables 2 and 3 provide us with some 
sense of the frequency and nature of communication among potential competitors.   With the 
exception of Ukraine, over a third of the manufacturing firms in all these countries communicate 
with other firms that produce goods similar to theirs at least once per month for some reason.  This 
may well be a function of the comparatively lower degree of competition in the Ukrainian 
manufacturing sector (see Table 1).   
Intra-sectoral communication on matters relating to customers and suppliers appears not to 
be all that unusual among East European firms.   Roughly a third of the firms in the Central and East 
European (CEE) countries report engaging in these sorts of contacts.  Hardly any firms, however, in 
Ukraine and Russia talk with their competitors about trade partners. This difference does not apply 
to technology and product design as healthy percentages of manufacturers across all of the countries  
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report sharing this kind of information.  Table 3 also shows that these two subjects hardly exhaust 
the potential matters for discussion.  Roughly half of all respondents report talking about “other 
subjects.” 
----------------------------- 
Place Tables 3 and 4 here 
----------------------------- 
Firms may also exchange valuable data with firms that are neither their competitors, nor 
their current (or even prospective) trade partners.  For one, they may share information with firms 
with whom they share an existing or potential trade partner.   These are the flows that we suspect 
would be the crucial building blocks of a firm’s reputation in a nascent market.  Table 4 lays out 
responses to questions regarding the frequency of a respondent’s communication with its newest 
trade partner’s trade partners.  Here again, we see tremendous variation across countries.  Confirming 
Hendley  et al.’s (2000) finding, in Russia, over sixty percent of the firms report having at least 
monthly communications with other suppliers of their newest customer.  But in the four other 
countries, these types of contacts are much less frequent.   In Poland, Romania and Ukraine, less 
than ten percent report talking on at least a monthly basis with the suppliers of their newest 
customer.   A similar relationship can be seen in the answers to a question regarding communications 
with the other clients of a respondent’s newest supplier.   
From the manner in which the survey questions above were structured, we cannot know 
definitively whether the reported firm-to-firm communication has been carried out within or outside 
the framework of a mediating institution like a trade association.  That is, some firms may 
communicate with their competitors and/or others because they share membership in the same trade 
association.8  However, evidence will be presented in Section 4 that suggests that these questions 
effectively capture unmediated information flows.   
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Table 5 provides data on trade association membership and the services provided to 
constituents.  Membership rates are lowest in Poland and highest in Russia and Ukraine.9  Moreover, 
we see that association members in these two former Soviet republics rely upon them 
disproportionately for contract and/or dispute arbitration services.  To the extent that these 
associations may offer services privately that substitute for ineffective or missing public institutions, 
these results are not surprising.  As shown in Table 1, Russian and Ukrainian firms were the most 
skeptical about the effectiveness of the public courts. 
----------------------------- 
Place Tables 5 and 6 here 
----------------------------- 
We also present data on a firm’s primary source of information about their newest customer 
and newest supplier before the relationship was initiated.  Table 6 shows that prior business 
acquaintances are important sources of information in all the countries. Informal networks of family 
and friends play some role as well, particularly in Romania.10  We also see that trade associations play 
relatively important roles in Romania, Ukraine and Russia as sources of information about 
prospective clients and suppliers. 
And lastly, we present our measure of reputation flows.  The dependent variable in our 
subsequent regression analysis is taken from a series of questions that ask respondents about 
business disputes.  Firms were first asked two questions about a potential disagreement involving 
their newest customer: 
(1a)   If your firm had a dispute with this customer, would other suppliers of this 
customer find out about it? 
(1b)   If this customer had a dispute with another firm, would your company find 
out about it?  
Firms were then asked similar questions about a potential dispute involving their newest supplier:  
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(2a)   If your company had a dispute with this supplier, would other customers of 
this supplier find out about it? 
(2b)   If this supplier had a dispute with another firm, would your company find 
out about it? 
With respect to the scenarios described in questions 1a and 2a, the respondent would be in the 
position of potentially supplying valuable information to other, interested parties.  For questions 1b 
and 2b, the respondent would be on the receiving end of any reputation flow.   
These questions allow us to evaluate the extent to which information relating to a firm’s 
business history circulates among a community of firms.  Table 7 shows that there is not an 
insignificant amount of cross-country variation in the responses to these questions.  For instance, 
relative to firms in Ukraine, a high percentage of Russian firms believe that news of an inter-firm 
dispute would be much more likely to “get out.”  We might also generalize that firms are more 
confident that they will learn of a trade partner’s dispute in another relationship than that a dispute 
between themselves and that trade partner would become known to others.  What these data do not 
reveal, of course, are the answers to how and why this information “gets out.”  
----------------------------- 
Place Table 7 here 
----------------------------- 
4.   Determinants of Reputation Flows 
Based on our discussion to this point, we would anticipate that a firm’s response to the 
“reputation flow” questions would first be sensitive to the nature of the information networks or 
channels into which it is already plugged.  The greater the extent to which one was “plugged in” to 
mediated and unmediated information flows, presumably, should be positively related to supplying 
and being supplied with news relating to inter-firm disputes.   This could be due either to (1) the  
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lower costs of inter-firm communication within a network or (2) the positive incentives therein for 
sharing information, or both. 
If this is true, firms that already communicate regularly with other firms (in addition to their 
regular trade partners) will be more likely to publicize their disputes with trade partners and to find 
out about those partners’ disputes with others.  We might also expect that membership in an 
organization like a trade association that supplies members with information on existing and 
potential trade partners would be more likely to partake in both the provision and receipt of 
information relating to contract disputes.  We do not, however, have strong priors as to the relative 
magnitudes of these two channels in terms of promoting these flows.   
Second, we would expect that a firm’s supply of and demand for reputational information 
would be sensitive to its experience with contractual disputes and its perception of the ability of 
courts to resolve them.  To the extent that the circulation of this information can substitute for 
ineffective courts, we would expect that a less favorable view of public institutions would be 
associated with a greater reliance on information exchange for the purposes of relational contracting 
(Johnson et al., 2002).   We might also suspect that a firm that has had a history with contractual 
problems might be more attuned to the value of relational contracting and inter-firm information 
exchange.  
Third, we would expect reputation flows to be sensitive to the characteristics of a specific 
relationship between the respondent and its newest trade partner.  These bilateral relationship 
characteristics might include, first, the risk that the trade partner would be particularly willing to 
renege on an agreement with the respondent.  A bilateral relationship involving more risk and for 
which more is at stake for the respondent is likely to result in a more elaborate governance structure 
(Williamson, 1985).   For instance, the degree to which a responding firm faces high search costs to 
replace a particular trade partner may influence either its desire to seek out reputational information  
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or its decision to spread information on a dispute that the two might have.  A firm might be 
particularly motivated to track down the performance record of a supplier from which it may be 
receiving an input that could not easily be found from another source.  Or a supplier whose client 
can easily find alternative suppliers of the same input might be more interested in applying the threat 
of publicizing its bad behavior.  The same might be true for a supplier that had made an investment 
in the relationship (e.g., had offered trade credit).   
A second set of relationship-specific characteristics that may influence reputation flows 
involves the manner in which the respondent learned about its trade partner (Johnson et al., 2002).  
For one, that initial source of information may itself be a source of information on the firm’s history 
or it might be, directly or indirectly, connected to other sources that are.   For another, that source 
might be considered by the respondent to offer particularly trustworthy (untrustworthy) referrals in 
which case the respondent might not feel (feel) a need to seek out additional information about the 
firm’s performance history.    
Given these considerations, we explore the determinants of reputation flows in a series of 
probit regressions on each of the reputation flow questions (1a-2b).  The dependent variable in each 
takes on the value of one if a firm’s response to a particular question (1a-2b) is “yes” and zero if the 
response is “no.”  Per our previous discussion, as controls we include a vector of variables 
characterizing the information channels or networks into which the respondent is already plugged, a 
vector capturing the respondent’s experience with contractual violations and its attitudes toward the 
ability of courts to address them, and a vector characterizing the particular bilateral relationship about 
which the respondent is being asked.  We also include country and branch dummies as well a series 
of respondent and trade partner controls.   
4.1  Effects of Alternate Channels for Inter-firm Communication    
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Our primary interest here will be in the regressors that represent potential channels (or 
networks) for disseminating information.  Table 8 presents the regression results from questions 1a 
and 1b (i.e., the questions that address a dispute involving the respondent’s newest customer) in 
columns 1-4 and 5-8, respectively.11  The first four columns of Table 8 report results from a probit 
regression in which the dependent variable represents the respondent’s answer to the question of 
whether or not other suppliers of its newest customer would find out about a dispute between the 
respondent and that customer.  Controls are included for both the frequency with which the 
respondent talks with its competitors about suppliers and customers and the frequency with which it 
talks with other suppliers of this particular customer.   
We see that if a firm communicates on at least a monthly basis with its client’s other 
suppliers, there is a 22% greater chance that news of the dispute will reach other firms.   Both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of this effect remain consistent across several specifications.   
Similarly, as demonstrated in columns 5-8, those same firms are roughly 16% more likely to expect to 
learn of a customer’s disputes with other firms.   These effects are statistically significant at the .01 
level.  In general, these results suggest that the nature of the communication networks in which the 
respondent is already participating influences subsequent reputation flows.    
Columns 1-8, however, demonstrate that the frequency of pre-existing communication with 
one’s competitors about trade partners does not produce a statistically significant impact on the 
dissemination of dispute-related information.  Our inability to confirm any relationship here may 
reflect firms’ desire not to lose rents that would accrue to them by holding valuable, non-public 
information about a client with whom a competitor may be interested in doing business; or it may 
simply reflect the less pointed nature of the question regarding competitors (i.e., one question asks 
whether the respondent talked to other suppliers of this particular customer, while the other asked  
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about talking with competitors about trade partners generally).  We return to this matter in the 
discussion of Table 9. 
In columns 2 and 6 of Table 8, a dummy variable has been added that takes on the value of 
one if the respondent is a member of a trade association.   In both of these regressions, we see that 
simple membership in a trade association does not increase a firm’s access to reputation flows.  In 
neither is the effect of this variable statistically significant.  Perhaps this should not be terribly 
surprising since, as Table 5 indicated, a trade association can be a multi-purpose organization that 
may or may not count the provision of information on trade partners among its services provided 
(Doner and Schneider, 2000).    
In columns 3 and 7, we exchange the trade association membership dummy for a more 
narrowly defined variable that takes the value of one only if the firm is a member in a trade 
association that offers information services -- that is, one that helps identify and locate new trade 
partners and/or provides information on their trustworthiness (see Table 5).   Membership in a trade 
association with these services is positively associated with reputation flows when the dispute 
involves the customer and the respondent (column 3).  In this case, information on the dispute is 6% 
more likely to be spread, an effect that is significant at the .10 level.   The effect of this variable, 
however, is not statistically significant when the question relates to a potential dispute between the 
respondent’s customer and another firm.     
In columns 4 and 8, we add an interaction term to the model specified in columns 3 and 6; it 
takes on the value of one if the respondent is a member of a trade association with information 
services and its newest customer is located in or near the city in which the respondent is located.12  In 
both cases, the effects of the trade association dummy and the interaction term are highly significant.   
That is, we have strong evidence that the value of a trade association as a conduit for reputation 
flows is contingent upon the geographic location of the member’s (i.e., respondent’s) trade partner.   
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For customers that are located in the same city, the magnitude of the marginal effect of membership 
in a trade association with information services is near zero.   Summing the two coefficients on these 
variables, we see that being a member of a trade association with information services makes it only 
roughly 2% more likely that information on a dispute involving the respondent and a “nearby” 
customer is disseminated (see column 4); moreover, it makes absolutely no difference as to whether 
information on a dispute involving a “nearby” customer and another firm becomes known to the 
respondent (see column 8).      In this sense, the marginal value of trade association membership is 
zero.    
----------------------------- 
Place Tables 8 and 9 here 
----------------------------- 
However, if the customer is not located in or near the respondent’s hometown then the 
marginal effect of the trade association is quite noteworthy.  Disputes involving the respondent and 
that customer become 18% more likely to become publicized; whereas disputes involving other firms 
and the customer are 13% more likely to become known.  These effects are significant at the .01 and 
.05 levels, respectively.   To the extent that reputation flows support the development of markets, 
these findings suggest that trade associations may be of particular value in promoting transactions 
across geographic space.  In more localized relationships, alternative, less formal institutions for 
transmitting information appear to be of greater use; unmediated reputation flows, in this sense, 
appear to “crowd out” the mediated.     
Table 9 presents regressions in which the value of the dependent variable depends upon the 
expectation as to a potential dispute involving the firm’s newest supplier.13  Again, we see that 
information dissemination relating to current or future disputes is a function of the communication 
networks to which a firm already has access.  Similar to the questions dealing with the newest 
customer, we see that talking at least monthly with the other clients of one’s newest supplier makes it  
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more likely that news of contractual disputes is spread.  If the respondent talks with other clients of 
the supplier on at least a monthly basis, it is roughly 24% more likely to have its disputes with that 
supplier publicized (see columns 1-4) and 19% more likely to become aware of disputes involving the 
supplier and other firms (see columns 5-8).   These effects are both significant at the .01 level.    
A firm that talks on a monthly basis with its competitors about existing and potential trade 
partners is 15% more likely to believe that any dispute it might have with its newest supplier will 
become known by the supplier’s other customers.   This effect is significant at the .01 level.  In the 
regressions dealing with a dispute involving the newest supplier and another firm, the respondent is 
roughly 9% more likely to believe that it would learn about it if it is already communicating 
frequently with its competitors, an effect that is significant at the .10 level.  The frequency of 
communication with competitors thus seems to be more important to explaining reputation flows 
involving suppliers than those involving customers.  This suggests a different calculus with regards to 
divulging information about customers: information that might make it easier for competitors to 
attract a reliable customer, apparently, is more jealously guarded than analogous data on suppliers.  
As we saw above, the effect of generalized trade association membership is not statistically 
significant (columns 2 and 6).  But a firm that is in a trade association that identifies and/or vouches 
for the reliability of potential trade partners is at least 11% more likely to have its disputes with the 
supplier publicized and roughly 9% more likely to learn about its supplier’s disputes with others.  The 
effects are significant at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively.   Finally, the effect of the interaction term 
that was important to the models in Table 8 appears unimportant here in Table 9.  That is, the 
location of the supplier vis a vis the respondent does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
use of trade associations to channel reputation flows.    
By way of summarizing our discussion on the effects of different mechanisms for channeling 
reputation flows, we return to the distinction made earlier between mediated and unmediated  
 
16 
institutions.  As was already pointed out, answers to the questions addressing the frequency of 
communication with both competitors and a trade partner’s trade partners did not allow us to 
delineate precisely whether or not such contacts, if they were present, were the result of mediated or 
unmediated communication.  It is at least conceivable that respondents provided answers to these 
questions with reference (at least in part) to services and/or occasions arranged by a trade association 
to which they belonged.  The results in Tables 8 and 9, however, suggest otherwise.  In both tables, 
when the controls for membership in trade associations with information services are added, the 
explanatory power of the other network variables remained unchanged.  This observation, in other 
words, is consistent with these variables representing unmediated communication (or at least 
communication that is not mediated by a trade association) between respondents and other firms.14  
If this is the case, our Tables 8 and 9 present ample evidence that both mediated and unmediated 
mechanisms generally both contribute to reputation flows.  Trade associations, with the exception of 
the case in which the talked-about firm is a local customer, can make an appreciable addition to the 
flow of information even in the presence of robust unmediated communication.  Moreover, 
conditional on membership in an organization that mediates reputation flows, a firm’s current 
participation in unmediated networks of information exchange increases the likelihood of it partaking 
in information exchange in the future. 
4.2   Contracting Problem Effects 
We now proceed to a brief discussion of other variables that may play a role in the exchange 
of reputational information.   We will focus our discussion on the specifications in columns 4 and 8 
in Table 8, as well as columns 3 and 7 in Table 9.  First, a firm’s attitude toward the court system as 
well as its own history with arrears are shown to be important to the dissemination of information on 
contract disputes.  Firms that are not optimistic about the courts’ abilities to enforce contracts are 
roughly 9% more likely to find out about a contractual dispute involving either their customer (Table  
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8, column 8) or their supplier (Table 9, column 7) and another firm; these effects are significant at 
the .05 and .01 level, respectively.   In other words, if firms are skeptical of the ability of public 
mechanisms to protect them from the bad behavior of their trade partners, they may be more 
vigorous in tracking down their partners’ behavioral histories.    The evidence for information flows 
in the opposite direction, however, is not as strong.   The negative relationship between confidence 
in the court system and other clients of the respondent’s supplier learning of a dispute between the 
respondent and the supplier is significant but only at the .10 level (Table 9, column 3).   There is no 
statistically significant relationship in this regard between confidence in the court system and other 
firms finding out about a dispute involving the respondent and its newest customer (Table 8, column 
4).    
Having a history with contractual disputes seems to predispose a firm to participate more in 
the exchange of reputational information.   A firm that has had problems collecting a debt in the past 
is roughly 11% more likely to believe that a future dispute involving it and its customer would be 
publicized, an effect that is significant at the .01 level (Table 8, column 4).  This evidence may suggest 
a learning process; firms that have experienced prior disputes may better understand the value, and 
therefore make better use of the mechanisms for relational contracting.  The same variable is shown 
to have a similar effect on the respondent learning about its client’s disputes with others; this effect is 
significant at the .10 level (Table 8, column 8).   A history of contractual disputes with suppliers is 
also shown to be an important explanatory variable.  If a firm’s supplier has ever refused to accept 
the return of defective merchandise or to refund money for goods returned due to low quality, it is 
more likely both to have its disputes with its newest supplier publicized (Table 9, column 3) and to 
learn about disagreements between that supplier and other firms (Table 9, column 7).   The effects 
are significant at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively.  
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There is thus a good deal of evidence that problems with public enforcement of contracts as 
well as actual experiences with breach of contract influence the demand for and supply of 
reputational information.  The evidence suggests that firms that are dubious of the courts’ abilities 
are particularly eager to seek out information on the behavior histories of their trade partners.  Firms 
that have firsthand knowledge of contractual disputes, perhaps through a learning process, appear to 
be more inclined to participating in information exchange on both the supply and demand sides.  
4.3  Bilateral Relationship Effects 
We now turn our attention to potential determinants of reputation flows that are specific to 
the bilateral relationship in which a dispute might occur.  In this regard, we first explore variables that 
capture the costs to the two parties of terminating their relationship.  A firm, for instance, might face 
high termination costs if it is difficult or time consuming to find a trade partner to replace its current 
one.  Additionally, a firm that must invest in an asset whose value is specific to the bilateral 
relationship faces a higher cost of termination.  By increasing the costs of termination, higher search 
costs and asset specificity both increase the cost of trade partner opportunism and, for the 
respondent, raise the value of preventative contracting mechanisms (Williamson, 1985).  We might 
thus expect to find that a firm whose search costs are higher or one whose stake in the continuation 
of a specific relationship is greater, would be more likely to resort to (the threat of) disseminating 
information on a trade partner’s misbehavior.  Conversely, lower termination costs for the trade 
partner reduce its cost of behaving opportunistically vis a vis the respondent, increasing the value to 
the former of preventative contracting mechanisms such as reputation flows.             
In support of some of these hypotheses, we first see in Table 8 (column 4) that the longer 
the time for the respondent to find another buyer for its product (in the event that its most recent 
customer refuses delivery) the more likely that its disputes with that customer become known, an 
effect that is significant at the .10 level.  In other words, if the costs of termination are high, the  
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greater the value of this relationship to the respondent and the greater the value of disseminating the 
trade partner’s behavioral history so as to discourage opportunism.  We also see that a firm that has 
gives trade credit to its client and thus has more at stake in the relationship is more likely to avail 
itself of reputation mechanisms in the event of a dispute; this effect is significant at the .05 level.   
What is more, the less time that it takes for the customer to find an alternative supplier, the more 
likely that a dispute that it had with the supplier would be publicized.  That is, customers with outside 
options, with low costs of terminating the relationship, are more likely to be threatened with the 
punishment of having their bad behavior publicized since the cost to them of behaving 
opportunistically would otherwise be relatively low; this effect is significant at the .05 level.15    
Some of the variables that are meant to measure the costs of terminating the relationship 
between the respondent and its newest supplier also appear to explain variation in the dependent 
variable.     As was true for the questions involving customer relationships, the less that the 
respondent’s newest supplier is locked in to the bilateral relationship and the more that the 
respondent is locked in, the greater the magnitude of reputation flows.  If the supplier markets a 
product to the respondent that is not sold to other firms (for which it may have made investments 
that would not be recoverable if the relationship were to be terminated), a dispute between the two is 
less likely to become known by the supplier’s other customers; this effect is significant at the .05 level 
(Table 9, column 3).   If the supplier only produces to fill orders from the respondent, and does not 
maintain inventories for it (and thus has less to lose, ceteris paribus, if the relationship is terminated), 
the respondent is roughly 15% more likely to be on the supplying side of reputation flows; this effect 
is significant at the .01 level.    
The variables measuring the costs to the respondent of losing the relationship, interestingly, 
do not have as pronounced an effect.  As would be expected from the discussion above, firms that 
receive frequent (at least bi-weekly) deliveries from the supplier are more likely to publicize any  
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disputes, although the effect is significant at only the .10 level.  However, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the respondent publicizing a dispute with its supplier when it is the 
only supplier of a particular input.  Although the coefficient here is positive, as we would expect, it is 
not significant. 
The manner in which the respondent first learned of this customer also is important for the 
eventual dissemination of information on the respondent's contract disputes.  A firm that learned 
about its customer through a business contact (i.e., another customer, supplier or competitor) was 
over 7% more likely to think that information about a dispute with that customer would become 
known by that firm’s other suppliers.16  Similarly, the respondent is 16% more likely to find out about 
a dispute involving its customer and other firms.   The first effect is significant at the .05 level, the 
second at the .01 level.  A firm that learned about its most recent customer through a family or 
friend, however, is 13% less likely to have its disputes with that firm become publicly known.   This 
effect also is significant at the .01 level.   Finally, we see that if a firm received its information about 
the client from a trade association, the firm expects to find out about any trade dispute involving that 
client.  This effect also is significant at the .01 level.  However, the flow of information in the 
opposite direction, from the respondent to other firms, appears not to be as strong.  That is, learning 
of its client through a trade association does not have a demonstrable effect on whether or not a 
trade dispute of theirs with that client will become known to others.  
If the respondent’s primary source of information about the newest supplier prior to 
becoming its client was a trade association, it is 18% more likely that the respondent will learn about 
whether or not the firm becomes involved in a subsequent business dispute.  This effect is significant 
at the .01 level.  Similarly, there is a significant effect with regard to whether or not a firm’s dispute 
with the supplier becomes known to others.  Also as was the case with customers, receiving 
information about the supplier from a business contact is positively related to subsequent reputation  
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flows.  This effect is significant in terms of respondents’ expectation about learning of their supplier’s 
disputes with other firms.  
4.4    Split Samples and the Role of Market Structure 
  We now return to our focus on the effect of different information sharing mechanisms by 
re-running regression models initially presented in Tables 8 and 9 but for split samples based on the 
number of competitors that a respondent reports having in the same city.  We are particularly 
interested here to see if the relative importance of the different channels for reputation flows changes 
with a change in the structure of the respondent’s market.   In Table 10, we present the results from 
a regression model that mimics those presented in Table 8, columns 4 and 8, the only difference 
being that the sample is divided between firms that have one or no local competitors and firms that 
have more than five.  We only report the coefficients from the network variables.    
While there are no statistically significant differences between the coefficients on the 
variables which capture unmediated information sharing (monthly communication with competitors 
about suppliers and customers; and monthly communication with other suppliers of the customer), 
we do find that market structure has an appreciable effect on reputation flows through trade 
associations that offer information services.  Specifically, in both pairs of regressions in Table 10, the 
effect of the trade association variable is positive and highly significant for firms that have fewer than 
two local competitors; the difference between this coefficient and that on the same variable in the 
regressions run on firms with more than five local competitors is statistically significant at the .05 
level.   The magnitude of these effects is most easily captured with reference to a respondent whose 
customer is located outside the respondent’s hometown.  In this case, when the respondent faces 
little local competition, being a member of a trade association with information services makes it 
39% more likely to have any dispute with its customer made known to the other suppliers of that 
customer.  The effect when the respondent faces stiffer local competition is not statistically different  
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from zero.  In a similar fashion, that respondent is 29% more likely to learn of the customer’s dispute 
with another firm when local competition is minimal.  And again, the effect when the respondent 
faces more local competition is not statistically different from zero.  
----------------------------- 
Place Tables 10 and 11 here 
----------------------------- 
In Table 11, we present the results from regressions that are identical to those presented in 
Table 9, columns 3 and 7, the only difference being that the sample is divided between firms that 
have two or fewer local competitors and those that have more.  Again, the only statistically significant 
differences in coefficient pairs across the split samples are found with respect to the trade association 
variable.   There are no statistically significant differences, that is, between the coefficient pairs on the 
variables that capture unmediated information sharing.  But market structure does have an 
appreciable effect on whether reputation flows are directed through trade associations that offer 
information services.      When a firm faces little competition, being a member of a trade association 
with information services makes it 20% more likely that the respondent’s disputes with the supplier 
become known to the supplier’s other clients and 19% more likely that the respondent finds out 
about the supplier’s contractual problems with other firms.  However, the effects when the firm faces 
more competition are not statistically different than zero.        
The evidence in Tables 10 and 11 suggests that the mediated reputation flows may be more 
sensitive to strategic considerations.  Specifically, the findings are consistent with the supply of 
information to a trade association from either the respondent or its competitors depending upon the 
degree of competition in the local market.   Unmediated reputation flows are less sensitive in this 
regard, perhaps, because firms have greater control over to whom they are channeled.  For instance, 
a firm may share reputational information directly with a trusted customer or supplier when it 
perceives there to be value associated with that action and it knows that that information is unlikely  
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to be passed on to a competitor.  If, however, a firm shares information with a mediating institution, 
it may have to be more sensitive to weighing that value against the potential cost to it that the 
information is transmitted to another, less trusted, firm.  If, as seems reasonable, information 
channeled through a trade association is perceived as being more likely of reaching competitors, then 
we should not be surprised that the value of a trade association in channeling reputation flows 
diminishes in a more competitive environment.        
5.    Conclusion 
A firm’s reputation in a marketplace is shaped by the nature of communication among other 
market actors.   Our analysis suggests that if one behaves badly vis a vis a trade partner, knowledge of 
the infraction will be more widely disseminated if the aggrieved possesses the willingness and ability 
to spread the information.    Similarly, the information might be more widely disseminated if parties 
external to the relationship in which the grievance occurred have reasons to seek out, as well as the 
means to acquire, the offending firm’s behavioral history.   We confirm here that firms’ participation 
in and access to inter-firm communication channels are both important determinants of the 
dissemination of reputation-relevant information.      
More specifically, we show that some, but not all, trade associations have a real and 
significant effect on inter-firm reputation flows.  Even when we control for the frequency of 
communication with competitors and trade partners, being a member of a trade association that 
offers information services generally has a positive and significant effect on the circulation of news 
relating to contractual disputes.   Trade association membership, in these cases, does not just 
represent a veneer of mediation on existing, unmediated reputation flows.  The associations, 
themselves, seem to facilitate inter-firm information exchange.   The exception to this finding comes 
in the relationship with local customers.  A trade association member, in this case, is neither more  
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likely to have its disputes publicized nor learn of the customer’s disputes with others; unmediated 
mechanisms seem to “crowd out” mediated mechanisms.     
Our results also suggest the powerful role of unmediated communication.  Controlling for 
membership in a trade association that offers information services, we found that the frequency with 
which a firm talks with its trade partner’s trade partners influences reputation flows.  Monthly 
communication with other suppliers of one’s customer and with other clients of one’s supplier 
meaningfully increases the probability that future disputes involving one’s trade partners will become 
known.  Interestingly, however, communication with competitors has an uneven effect on reputation 
flows; it promotes reputation flows when the dispute involves a supplier but not when it concerns a 
customer.   
In a similar vein, we find that reputation flows through trade associations are much more 
sensitive to the competitiveness of local markets and, in this sense, seem to be utilized more 
strategically.  It is plausible that this could be because an aggrieved firm that is the initial source of a 
reputation flow does not have as much control over who is on the receiving end when that 
information is shared with a mediating institution.     
For reputation flows to serve as the basis for relational contracting, information must be 
exchanged between and among market participants.  The same holds true if the diffusely held stock 
of knowledge on firms’ behavioral histories is to reduce search costs and mitigate adverse selection.   
In this paper, we have shown how both mediated and unmediated mechanisms can work in tandem 
to promote these flows.  We have also shown that the flows are sensitive to the specific features of 
the relationship in which a contractual problem might arise.   And we have also confirmed that they 
are sensitive to firm-level perceptions of the macro-institutional environment.  What we have not 
been able to do here is assess directly either the private or social value of these flows.  Just because 
information is disseminated does not necessarily mean that it provokes a behavioral response that  
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increases market efficiency.  A firm might communicate to another the problems it has had with 
receiving payments from a client, but that other firm to which the information is communicated 
might never be in a position to use it, or that firm might not find the information trustworthy.  
Nevertheless, the fact that we found meaningful mediation of reputation flows is strongly suggestive 
that these flows have value.  The role that we see some trade associations playing suggests that the 
costs of this mediation have been willingly absorbed and the micro-level disincentives for sharing 
information have been overcome.  Presumably, this has been done because of the value that these 
flows provide.   Given these findings, one logical extension of our work here would be to explore 
why some associations develop this role and some do not. 
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TABLE 1. SELECTED SUMMARY DATA ON ALL SURVEYED FIRMS 
  
 All    Pol.  Slov.  Rom.  Rus.  Ukr. 
          
Avg. firm's age (years)  6.9  7.4  6.1  7.0  6.8  6.1 
          
Avg. number of employees   54.3  63.0  57.0  56.4  33.5  60.1 
          
Spun off from SOE  33%  22%  23%  12%  49%  69% 
          
Avg. number of competitors in city  7.1  10.7  6.5  8.8  3.2  1.9 
          
Customer failed to pay for product after delivery  54%  76%  81%  74%  15%  12% 
          
Supplier refused return of defective merchandise 
or to refund money for low quality merchandise  
24% 18% 37%  33%  9%  15% 
          
Believe court can enforce agreement with trade 
partner 








TABLE 2. HOW OFTEN DO YOU TALK WITH PRODUCERS OF GOODS  
SIMILAR TO YOURS? (% OF FIRMS RESPONDING "YES") 
 
 All    Pol.*  Slov.  Rom.  Rus.  Ukr. 
 
Weekly  15.1 18.8 23.1 15.6  3.2  5.5 
        
Monthly  21.9 18.1 16.9 20.6 43.6 15.1 
        
Less frequently or 
not at all 
61.0 55.0 60.1 63.9 53.2 79.5 
 
 









TABLE 3. DISCUSSION TOPICS OF FIRMS THAT COMMUNICATE AT LEAST MONTHLY 
WITH PRODUCERS OF GOODS SIMILAR TO THEIR OWN  
(% OF FIRMS RESPONDING "YES") 
          
  All  Pol. Slov.  Rom.  Rus. Ukr. 
 
Customers and suppliers  49.9  56.4  58.5  67.2  10.1  4.4 
 
Technology / product 
design 
68.0 64.2 58.5 64.7 92.8 78.3 
 












TABLE 4. FREQUENCY OF TALKING  
WITH TRADE PARTNER'S TRADE PARTNERS 
           
  All  Pol. Slov.  Rom.  Rus. Ukr. 
  
  With other suppliers of newest customer 
        
At  least  monthly  13.8 5.3 11.7 4.4 60.8 7.2 
Infrequently  10.8 4.3 10.7 5.0 11.4  33.5 
Not  at  all  75.3 90.4 77.6 90.7 27.9 59.3 
  
  With other clients of newest supplier 
          
At least monthly  13.5  9.4  8.9  7.8  67.6  3.7 
Infrequently  12.7 3.7 18.0 7.8 10.5  34.1 






TABLE 5.  BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS  
OF ASSOCIATION MEMBERS, % SAYING ASSOCIATIONS 
PROVIDE … 
  
% firms that 
















        
All  47.8 56.6 47.3 33.7 48.8 13.3 
Pol.    28.9 41.4 50.0 42.5 31.0 20.9 
Slov. 31.5 54.6 47.4 42.3 29.9 31.3 
Rom. 44.2 59.6 69.5 30.5 21.3  9.2 
Rus.  74.4 58.3 35.8 46.0 71.7  8.1 









TABLE 6. PRIMARY INITIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION … 
        
 All  Pol.  Slov.  Rom.  Rus.  Ukr. 
  
 About  newest  customer 
        
Managed / owned by family 
member or friend 
12.5 4.0 
 
13.0 22.7 10.1 11.6 
        
Previous business acquaintance  37.0 37.0 39.9 21.8 35.1 54.1 
        
Business association  9.7  2.0  4.9  14.0  10.4  17.9 
  
 About  newest  supplier 
        
Managed / owned by family 
member or friend 
7.2 3.0 9.1  15.6  3.3 3.7 
        
Previous business acquaintance  30.9 45.2 41.9 22.4 10.8 32.2 
        







TABLE 7. REPUTATION FLOWS  (% OF FIRMS RESPONDING "YES") 
      
All   Pol.  Slov.  Rom.  Rus.  Ukr. 
 
If your firm had dispute with this customer, would its other suppliers find out? 
      
27.7 26.7 35.7 22.8 41.7 10.8 
 
If this customer had a dispute with another firm, would your firm find out? 
      
34.2 29.7 42.2 32.7 40.0 24.1 
 
If your firm had dispute with this supplier, would its other customers find out? 
      
21.9 20.2 30.2 18.7 29.8  5.5 
 
If this supplier had dispute with another firm, would your firm find out? 
      





Table 8. Disputes Involving Newest Customer 
    
  If your company had a dispute with this 
customer, would its other suppliers find 
out? 
If this customer had dispute with another 
firm, would your company find out about it? 
   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
           
Alternate Channels for Inter-
firm Communication 
         
.055 .053 .048 .047 .043 .041 .039  .038  Talk to competitors about 
supps. & custs. at least monthly  (1.41) (1.37) (1.23) (1.20) (1.02) (0.97) (0.94)  (0.90) 
           
.226*** .228*** .225*** .227*** .161*** .165*** .160***  .160***  Talk with other sups. Of 
customer at least monthly  (4.63) (4.64) (4.61) (4.62) (3.22) (3.30) (3.20)  (3.21) 
           
 .017      .000     Member of trade association  
 (0.49)      (0.01)    
           
   .064*  .179***     .044  .132**  Member of trade assoc. w/ info. 
services …      (1.69)  (3.00)    (1.08)  (2.06) 
  
   -.156**      -.131*  Member of trade assoc. w/ info. 
services   x  customer close     (-2.49)        (-1.78) 
             
Contracting Problem Effects             
-.055 -.057 -.059 -.054  -.093**  -.095**  -.095**  -.091**  Can courts enforce an agreement 
with  a  customer  or  supplier?  (-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.55) (-1.44) (-2.27) (-2.30) (-2.31)  (-2.21) 
             
.110*** .111*** .114*** .109***  .066  .066 .073*  .069*  Has a customer ever failed to 
pay for a product after delivery?  (2.93) (2.95) (3.03) (2.87) (1.60) (1.61) (1.78)  (1.67) 
           
Bilateral Relationship Effects           
.072* .074* .076* .084** .078*  .080* .076*  .082*  Do you now or ever give credit 
to customer?  (1.80) (1.86) (1.89) (2.07) (1.82) (1.85) (1.76)  (1.88) 
           
.026* .025* .026* .026* -.016 -.017 -.016  -.015  If customer refused to accept 
delivery, length of time to find 
another customer? ++ 
(1.78) (1.75) (1.80) (1.81) (-1.02)  (-1.09)  (-0.97)  (-0.96) 
           
-.039** -.040** -.040** -.041**  .002  .000  -.001  -.002  If you failed to deliver these 
goods, how long for customer to 
find alternative supplier? ++  
(-2.34) (-2.39) (-2.43) (-2.48) (0.10)  (0.01) (-0.08)  (-0.11) 
           
Before transacting, what was primary source of information about customer? 
.074** .073** .073** .072**  .165***  .164*** .166***  .166***  … previous business 
acquaintance  (2.04) (2.01) (2.00) (1.98) (4.12) (4.08) (4.12)  (4.13) 
           
-.130*** -.130*** -.131*** -.132***  .013  .010  .007  .008  … managed or owned by family 
or  friend  (-2.74) (-2.74) (-2.74) (-2.77) (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
           
.026 .024 .029 .028  .226*** .223*** .228*** .230***  … business association 
(0.42) (0.39) (0.46) (0.43) (3.29) (3.25) (3.32)  (3.34) 
           
Country  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Respondent Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Trade  Partner  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
          
Prob  >  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Number  of  observations  902 900 899 899 896 894 893  893 
Pseudo  R-square  .1165 .1172 .1190 .1248 .0990 .1002 .1007  .1035 
Notes: (i) All regressions are probits with marginal effects reported; (ii) * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; (iii) t-stats 





Table 9. Disputes Involving Newest Supplier 
  If your company had dispute with this 
supplier, would its other clients find out? 
If this supplier had dispute with another 
firm, would your company find out? 
          
 (1)    (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Alternate Channels for Inter-firm 
Communication 
        
.154*** .154*** .149*** .152***  .093*  .093* .089* .091*  Talk to competitors about suppliers 
and customers at least monthly  (3.29) (3.29) (3.18) (3.23) (1.85) (1.85) (1.78) (1.80) 
          
.240*** .237*** .233*** .232*** .197*** .195*** .192*** .191***  Talk with other clients of supplier at 
least monthly  (5.94) (5.85) (5.75) (5.71) (4.62) (4.54) (4.47) (4.44) 
          
 .038      .029     Member of trade association 
 (1.21)      (0.85)    
          
   .110***  .069     .089**  .066  Member of trade association w/ 
information services      (3.12) (1.38)      (2.34) (1.21) 
          
    .073      .040  Member of trade association w/ 
information services x supplier close      (1.07)      (0.55) 
          
Contracting Problem Effects          
-.056 -.058*  -.061*  -.061*  -.094**  -.096**  -.098***  -.098***  Can courts enforce an agreement 
with  a  customer  or  supplier?  (-1.64) (-1.69) (-1.77) (-1.75) (-2.49) (-2.52) (-2.57) (-2.56) 
          
.076** .077** .081** .084**  .114***  .115*** .120*** .121***  Has a supplier ever refused to accept 
return of defective merchandise or to 
refund money for merchandise 
returned because of low quality 
(2.31) (2.34) (2.45) (2.51) (3.16) (3.19) (3.29) (3.32) 
          
Bilateral Relationship Effects          
-.123** -.123** -.126** -.121**  -.021  -.022  -.025  -.022  Does supplier make same product 
uniquely for your firm?  (-2.31)  (-2.31)  (-2.36) (-2.25) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.38) 
          
.156*** .156*** .153*** .152***  .103**  .103** .101** .100**  Does supplier produce only to fill 
orders (i.e., not  keep inventories)?  (4.17)  (4.16)  (4.07) (4.04) (2.47) (2.46) (2.39) (2.37) 
          
.055* .057* .053* .053*  .101***  .102*** .099*** .099***  Do you receive goods from supplier 
on at least a bi-weekly basis   (1.86)  (1.91)  (1.80) (1.79) (3.06) (3.10) (3.01) (3.01) 
          
.029 .033 .039 .043 .030 .033 .040 .042  Do you have other suppliers of this 
input? (0.93)  (1.04)  (1.25) (1.36) (0.87) (0.97) (1.16) (1.21) 
          
Before you began working with this supplier, what was your primary source of information?   
.040 .042 .044 .043 .044 .046 .049 .049  … previous business acquaintance 
(1.21) (1.27) (1.34) (1.32) (1.21) (1.26) (1.34) (1.33) 
          
.045 .050 .055 .053  .125**  .129**  .133**  .132**  … managed or owned by family or 
friend  (0.86) (0.96) (1.05) (1.02) (2.15) (2.21) (2.28) (2.26) 
          
.099* .098* .097* .100*  .178***  .177*** .177*** .178***  … business association 
(1.71) (1.69) (1.67) (1.71) (2.84) (2.83) (2.81) (2.83) 
          
Country  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respondent Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trade  Partner  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Prob  >  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations  885  884  882  882  876  875  873  873 
Pseudo  R-square  .1470 .1483 .1565 .1577 .1248 .1251 .1294 .1297 
Notes: (i) All regressions are probits with marginal effects reported; (ii) * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; (iii) t-stats 





Table 10. Local Market Structure and Customer Disputes 
  If your company had dispute with 
this customer, would its other 
suppliers find out? 
  If this supplier had dispute with 
another firm, would your company 
find out? 
          
  Number of similar firms in the same city 
   
  < 2  > 5    < 2  > 5 
        
0.181 0.099  -0.046  0.141  Talk to competitors about 
suppliers and customers at least 
monthly 
(1.49) (1.58)  (0.41) (2.18)** 
  0.251 0.245  0.269  0.175 
(2.53)** (2.75)***  (2.59)***  (2.02)**  Talk with other suppliers of 
customer at least monthly         
        
0.388 -0.014  0.291  -0.086  Member of trade association w/ 
information services (3.51)***  (0.12)  (2.51)**  (0.77) 
        
-0.265 0.014  -0.223  0.032  Member of trade association w/ 
information services x supplier 
close 
(2.54)** (0.10)  (1.67)*  (0.23) 
    
 
  
Controls for contracting 
problem effects 
Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
Controls for bilateral 
relationship effects 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry  Controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Respondent Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade Partner Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
    
 
  
Prob > chi2  0.0067  0.0169  0.0001  0.0005 
Number of observations  302  290  321  307 
Pseudo R-square  .1790  .1755 
 
.1964 .2046 
Notes: (i) All regressions are probits with marginal effects reported; (ii) * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; (iii) t-stats 
reported in parentheses; (iv) numbers in bold represent statistically significant difference in pair of coefficients; (v) specifications are same 




Table 11. Local Market Structure and Supplier Disputes 
  If your company had dispute with 
this supplier, would its other clients 
find out? 
  If this supplier had dispute with 
another firm, would your company 
find out? 
          
  Number of similar firms in the same city 
   
  ≤ 2  > 2    ≤ 2  > 2 
        
0.039 0.191  0.042  0.082  Talk to competitors about 
suppliers and customers at least 
monthly 
(0.48) (3.29)***  (0.43)  (1.32) 
 0.295  0.204  0.228  0.172 
(4.68)*** (3.59)***  (3.38)***  (2.80)***  Talk with other clients of 
supplier at least monthly         
        
0.205 0.042  0.193  0.007  Member of trade association 
with information services  (3.91)*** (0.85)  (3.31)***  (0.14) 
    
 
  
Controls for contracting 
problem effects 
Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
Controls for bilateral 
relationship effects 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry  Controls Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Respondent Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade Partner Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
    
 
  
Prob > chi2  0.0067  0.0169  0.0001  0.0005 
Number of observations  302  290  321  307 
Pseudo R-square  .1790  .1755 
 
.1964 .2046 
Notes: (i) All regressions are probits with marginal effects reported; (ii) * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; (iii) t-stats 
reported in parentheses; (iv) numbers in bold represent statistically significant difference in pair of coefficients; (v) specifications are same 





                                                           
1 The author would like to thank Michael Alexeev, Jeff Carpenter, David Colander, Jessica Holmes, Jon Isham, 
Simon Johnson, Jim Leitzel, Peter Matthews, John Nye as well as seminar participants at Middlebury College, 
Union College, the Centre for European Integration Studies and the University of Munich’s Seminar for 
Comparative Economics for their helpful comments. 
2 Johnson et al. do not focus on the relationship between trade association membership and these actions.  
Rather, they concentrate on the relationship between the perceived effectiveness of courts and the use of 
relational contracts.   
3 They do, however, control for the firm’s initial source of information about its trade partner.  They show, for 
instance, that firms identified by business contacts as well as friends or family members are more likely to 
receive trade credit. 
4 We should note that the welfare impact of these inter-firm reputation flows might be ambiguous.  If the 
networks through which they are channeled are not accessible to all market actors, it is conceivable that firms 
that are “on the outside” may potentially be more productive but are ultimately uncompetitive because of their 
lack of access to the existing stock of reputational information.  In this case, the welfare impact of reputation 
flows will be a function of the social value of information exchange within the network and the social cost of 
excluding those “on the outside.” 
5 It has long been recognized that in many environments organized business groups pursue objectives that 
benefit their members to the net detriment of society (Smith, 1776; Olson, 1965 and 1982).  A relatively newer 
strand of research, some cited in this paper, highlights how, particularly in countries with weak or failed states, 
organized business groups provide members with services and institutions that enhance the performance of 
markets and create net social benefits 
6 This finding runs parallel to what Pyle (2002) reports from the Russian financial sector, in which banks 
generally refrained from sharing information on delinquent borrowers through a mediating institution, even 
though a well-functioning organizational structure, the Association of Russian Banks, could have been used for 
this purpose.  
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7 With the exception of Slovakia, respondents were drawn from a single, medium-sized city in each country: 
Volgograd, Russia; Dnepopetrovsk, Ukraine; Katowice, Poland; Brasov, Romania.  In Slovakia, roughly half of 
the firms were from Kosice and Bratislava with the rest coming from one of seven other cities.   The survey 
was designed to address the institutional constraints confronting SME development and included nearly three 
hundred questions that were to be asked of firm management.  A more comprehensive discussion of the survey 
can be found in Johnson et al. (2000).    
8 Recanatini and Ryterman (2001) report that Russian trade associations are diversely populated; they include 
financial institutions and a firm's trade partners as well as its competitors.  
9 Studies by Recantini and Ryterman (2001) and Frye (2002) report membership rates in Russia that are more in 
line with the averages reported here for the Central and East European countries.  
10 Alternative responses not presented in Table 6 include banks and government agencies (relatively important 
sources in Russia) and direct contacts from the prospective trade partner and advertisements (relatively 
important in Eastern Europe).   
11 Respondent controls include a dummy for whether or not a firm in the same city had been set up by a 
former employee, the responding firm's age, whether or not it was a spin-off from a state enterprise, the 
number of producers of similar goods in same city, the number of employees, proportion of sales made to 
firms in the city, proportion of sales made to firms of different ownership type, a dummy for whether or not 
firm sells to intermediaries such as a wholesaler, the number of customers and the customer turnover rate.  
Trade partner (customer) controls include a dummy for whether it is located in the same city as the respondent, 
a dummy for whether or not firm is wholly domestically owned, dummies for the firm's type (e.g., private 
industrial firm, state trading company, etc.), and the number of months it had been a customer. 
12 Roughly two-thirds, 66.4%, of respondents’ customers are located in or near the city in which the 
respondents were based.  Additionally, we should note that we also include a control for whether the customer 
is located in or near the same city as the respondent; it is one of the standard “respondent controls.” 
13 Respondent controls include: a dummy for whether or not a firm in the same city had been set up by a 
former employee, the responding firm's age, whether or not it was a spin-off from a state enterprise, the  
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number of producers of similar goods in same city, the number of employees, proportion of purchases made 
from firms in the city, and proportion of purchases made from firms of different ownership type.  Trade 
partner (supplier) controls include geographical location relative to respondent, a dummy for whether or not 
firm wholly domestically owned, dummies for the firm's type (e.g., private industrial firm, state trading 
company), and the number of months it had been a customer. 
14 The correlation coefficients between membership in a trade association with information services and both 
talking monthly with competitors and talking monthly with a customer’s other suppliers are both low: -.011 and 
.077, respectively. That between membership in a trade association with information services and talking 
monthly with the other clients of one’s supplier is .044.   
15 Note that the relationship of the “time to find a new trade partner” variables do not have a statistically 
significant impact on the respondent learning of a dispute involving its customer and another trade partner 
(Table 8, column 8).  Relative to their relationship to reputation flows from (as opposed to to) the respondent, 
this may not e surprising.  Reputation flows that respond to termination costs address the needs for developing 
contracting mechanisms given the potential for the trade partner to behave opportunistically; if the responding 
firm only cares about curbing the customer’s opportunism in its transactions with itself, then there is no reason 
we should expect the respondent to seek out information on the customer’s contractual disputes with other 
firms. 
16 The unobserved reference group here includes all other responses some of which were offered by the survey 
others of which were provided unprompted – e.g., banks, government agencies, direct contacts from the 
prospective trade partner, advertisements, etc.  
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